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ON REASONABLE NONBELIEF AND PERFECT
LOVE: REPLIES TO HENRY AND LEHE
J. L. Schellenberg

Some Christian philosophers wonder whether a God really would oppose
reasonable nonbelief. Others think the answer to the problem of reasonable
nonbelief is that there isn’t any. Between them, Douglas V. Henry and
Robert T. Lehe cover all of this ground in their recent responses to my work
on Divine hiddenness. Here I give my answers to their arguments.

In independent essays published in this journal, Douglas V. Henry and
Robert T. Lehe respond to the argument of my Divine Hiddenness and
Human Reason (DH).1 Both take issue with my claim that there are individuals who lack the belief that there is a God through no fault of their own –
who exhibit inculpable or (as I have called it) reasonable nonbelief. Lehe,
in addition, seeks to undermine my support for the view that a perfectly
loving God would prevent such nonbelief. I appreciate the attention these
authors have given to my work. Their efforts permit us to improve our
understanding of the problem they address. So I hope I may be forgiven
for nonetheless concluding that their central assumptions and contentions
cannot reasonably be believed.
1. Common Complaints
I begin with criticisms applicable to both essays. First, both writers mistakenly assume that reasonable nonbelief is reasonable doubt. In DH I indicate that nonbelief is to be understood in terms of an absence of theistic
belief (realized by both doubt and disbelief), and that there are several
forms of reasonable nonbelief, including both reflective and unreflective
forms, but that I want for the sake of convenience and philosophical interest to focus on a certain sort of reflective doubt.2 Despite this, both Henry
and Lehe have conflated genus with species here. Henry’s central aim is to
show that reasonable nonbelief probably does not exist, but he never
speaks of anything but doubt. He clearly considers this restriction to be
my own, going so far as to suggest (75) that my whole book is concerned
with a certain sort of suffering occasioned by doubt. Lehe also falls into this
error (167), and in a section in which he critiques my “premise 3”, which
refers to the existence of reasonable nonbelief, similarly restricts his attention to doubt, influenced by the mistaken view – apparently also present in
Henry (79) – that I take nonbelief to exclude disbelief by definition (160).
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Because of these errors, even if our authors are right in all they say,
nothing follows for nonbelief in general, since plenty of instances of nonbelief do not presuppose reflection or involve doubt. Moreover, there are, as
already suggested, good grounds for supposing some of these latter
instances of nonbelief to be quite reasonable in the sense at issue (i.e. inculpable). Many unreflective nonbelievers have never so much as had the
theistic idea in question here squarely before their minds, and so have
never been in a position to respond to it at all, whether culpably or inculpably (discriminating investigation of non-western traditions will suffice to
show this); and some of those who have heard of the idea have nonetheless, due to formative factors of upbringing and/or culture beyond their
control, never been in a position to see the importance of thinking about it,
and so have also never been in a position to respond to it in one way or the
other.3 Thus the view apparently held by Lehe and explicitly defended by
Henry, viz. that there is or probably is no reasonable nonbelief, is not only
unsupported but false. Notice that this first set of criticisms alone suffices
to show that Henry’s case, as well as that part of Lehe’s which concentrates
on an alleged lack of support for belief in the reasonableness of nonbelief,
are unsuccessful.
Second (and this set of points is importantly related to the previous one),
both essays appear to overlook the fact that my understanding of ‘reasonable’ and of ‘unreasonable’ nonbelief is derived from reflection on the love of
God, and not determined by independent consideration of what these
notions can be taken to mean. If a loving God exists, then – I have argued –
evidence causally sufficient for belief is always operative among those who
have not freely shut themselves off from God, since otherwise they are not
able to enter into personal relationship with God.4 The presence of God, if
God exists and is perfectly loving, will be like a light that – however much
the degree of its brightness may fluctuate – must remain on unless one shuts
one’s eyes or deliberately flicks a switch designed to turn it off. So in thinking about whether the world is as we might expect it to be if a loving God
exists, it is useful to consider whether everyone who fails to believe has culpably resisted evidence that would otherwise have been causally sufficient
for belief; and if there is anyone at all whose nonbelief is inculpable, our
answer here must clearly be in the negative, for the existence of nonbelief
that is inculpable simpliciter entails the absence of universal culpable resistance of God.5 It follows that any nonbelief that is not the fault of the subject
(whether reflective or unreflective, and whether instantiated by doubt, disbelief or neither) must appear problematic if we approach this matter from the
perspective afforded by rumination on the love of God (and ‘reasonable’ is
just the more pleasing word I have chosen to use to express the notion of
inculpability that emerges from such rumination). That Henry and Lehe
both refer in this connection only to doubt and the suffering sometimes occasioned by it, and also their tendency to think of my notion of reasonable nonbelief as rooted in an independently motivated internalist epistemology,6
show that they fail to appreciate how that perspective comes into play in my
development of the problem of reasonable nonbelief.
Third, both essays give less than sufficient attention to how self-deception may enter into nonbelief and render it culpable. According to the cri-
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terion that I formulate and that both essays reproduce, if the reflective
doubter has not knowingly (self-deceptively or non-self-deceptively)
neglected to submit her belief that there is epistemic parity between theism
and atheism to adequate investigation, then she is inculpably in doubt.7
Lehe (171) interprets this as implying that one can be in a state of selfdeceptive neglect and consciously aware of one’s neglect at the same time,
and accordingly suggests that my criterion is inadequate. But the sort of
self-deception to which I refer – as indicated in DH –8 involves only an initial awareness of neglect and subsequently the lack of awareness Lehe rightly associates with the state (which is owed to steps taken to forget the
neglect). The initial awareness and deliberate forgetting suffice to make
the neglect which one later fails to notice voluntary, and culpable so long
as it lasts. These things are also necessary for voluntariness and culpability
in such neglect, for if an individual at no point makes an intentional contribution (which entails awareness of what is done) to her neglectful state,
how is it something she has done, and how can she be blamed for it? This
is important, because it shows that persons not given to dishonesty as blatant as has just been described make very poor candidates for doubt that is
self-deceptively culpable. And this means that we can be much more confident in our judgments as to the absence of self-deceptive culpability in
doubt than either Henry or Lehe seems prepared to allow. Both writers
(though this is less blatant in Henry) suggest that such culpability is always
a possibility, and can perhaps never reasonably be ruled out (see Henry,
81, 84; Lehe, 170). But it seems clear that we can sometimes have good
grounds for believing an individual to be honest, and so probably not
guilty of any such deceptive behavior as is required here (honesty after all
entails a reliable tendency to avoid it), and also that some doubters are honest. Now the notion of self-deception is notoriously slippery, and so it is
perhaps not inconceivable that it should plausibly be developed in such a
way as to permit us to speak of psychological mechanisms of which one is
never aware producing a state of doubt whose true source is always hidden
from one. Henry and Lehe seem sometimes to have such a notion in mind.
But then, by the same token, we are speaking about self-deception that is
involuntary, and so not culpable.
2. Peculiar Problems: Henry
In addition to the difficulties already mentioned, in which both Henry and
Lehe have a share, each writer seems to me to fall into certain errors all his
own – errors whose detection and dissection will serve to enlarge our
understanding of the problem of reasonable nonbelief. I begin with
Henry’s interesting and genial essay. Its central argument is that my criterion of inculpable doubt, and what I say about the circumstances in which
it would allow for a favorable verdict, show “that claims of adequate investigation [on the part of doubters] cannot be confirmed”, and also that there
probably is no inculpable doubt, since even if adequate investigation did
occur, it “would not result in the satisfaction with evidential parity characteristic of nonbelief” (82). That is, anyone who did investigate carefully
enough would never cease to look, as do doubters who believe that there is
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evidential parity between theism and atheism.
There are several problems here – problems with regard to how Henry
understands (1) the nature of the investigation that is relevant in this context, (2) its object, and also (3) the standards by reference to which I have
suggested it may be assessed. I will briefly comment on each of these.
(1) It seems to me that Henry has confused the absence of knowing neglect
of adequate investigation with objectively adequate investigation. My criterion of inculpable doubt, as indicated above, refers to the former not the latter, and yet Henry proceeds throughout as though it were the latter.9
Perhaps objectively adequate investigation would also be sufficient for
inculpability in this connection, but my criterion does not refer to this; and
such investigation is certainly not necessary for inculpability. Indeed, it is
quite possible for someone to avoid knowing neglect of adequate investigation, and thus avoid culpability, without ever achieving objectively adequate investigation. In the terminology of Swinburne’s Faith and Reason, I
could have a rational3 belief without having a rational5 belief. Thus even
if Henry is right that claims of objectively adequate investigation cannot be
confirmed here, it does not follow that claims of inculpable investigation
cannot be confirmed.
(2) We have been talking about someone whose investigation concerns
the belief that epistemic parity obtains between theism and atheism. This,
as we might say, is its object. Henry, however, seems to think that the
object of investigation is something more – he speaks, for example, of a
“commitment” to epistemic parity and of a tendency to “foreclose” inquiry
(81). This seems to me to involve conflating a parity belief (which is in an
important sense involuntary) with ceasing to inquire (which is in that sense
voluntary). There is no reason to think that the latter, or a tendency to the
latter, in any way follows from the former or needs to be defended by a
parity believer. Nothing in the nature of doubt or gleaned from observation of actual doubters gives so much as a hint of suggesting that doubters
invariably (or even often) stop investigating theism or find themselves ‘satisfied’ with epistemic parity between theism and atheism when they form
the belief that it obtains. Quite the contrary. Although a belief is formed
here, it does not involve a sense that the issue which concerns the doubter
has been settled, but rather a sense that the relevant evidence is such as to
prevent it from being settled. And this causes not satisfaction but frustration and agitation for many doubters – which frustration and agitation
keeps them looking for ways to revise this conclusion and render a more
satisfying verdict.
But perhaps Henry is thinking that it follows from the meaning of ‘parity
belief’ that a parity believer believes the evidence pertaining to theism to
be in some unqualified and objective and unrevisable sense inconclusive.
If so, he is mistaken. In DH I say this: “As I understand it, one who
believes that [theism and atheism] are at epistemic parity believes that,
given her evidence, she is not justified in holding either proposition to be
more probable than its denial – that neither is, for her, epistemically preferable to its denial.”10 Such an individual believes that the evidence in her possession does not justify thinking either theism or atheism more probable
than the other. This clearly is sufficient to generate doubt about theism at
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the time when that evidence is being considered while being quite compatible with further investigation and the formation of some other belief in
future because of the influence of new evidence.
His essay indicates that Henry may be led in the direction of a different
understanding by my suggestion that doubters who desire to believe (one
way or the other) would arrive at a parity belief only when they have no
other option and after all alternatives have been exhausted, for he takes
this to “imply the impossibility of searching for further evidence” (82). But
the alternatives I had in mind here, which a doubter who desires to believe
will entertain for as long as she can hold a parity belief at bay, are the alternatives to a parity belief, viz. the view that her evidence supports theism over
atheism and the view that it supports atheism over theism. And if what
one has ‘exhausted’ are alternatives to a belief as to what one’s present evidence can justify, nothing follows with respect to the future – certainly no
suggestion to the effect that all the evidence has been exhausted can be said
to follow. There is therefore no support for Henry’s strong interpretation
of epistemic parity in the suggestion to which he appeals.
It is worth noting that Henry’s strong interpretation of epistemic parity
may also derive from the view that anything less is not likely to be very
useful in an argument against the existence of God (and so is not likely to
be emphasized by me). In the second half of his paper he acknowledges
the possibility of a weaker interpretation of the sort which I have actually
emphasized, but has this to say:
[I]f this is what reasonable nonbelief means, it becomes less than clear
that it constitutes an evil preclusive of God’s existence. After all, if one
really is not satisfied with the parity position, presumably one continues
the search for new information that will break the evidential logjam in
favor of an answer to the question of God’s existence. There is nothing
problematic about looking for evidence to settle a question, and for
obvious reasons, God, if he exists, might not foreclose someone’s ongoing and free inquiry (82).11
But here again we only see the effects of not taking seriously my argument’s starting point in reflection on the nature of Divine love. Henry (and
also Lehe and others) find it tempting to start a reconstruction of my argument, as it were, ‘from below’, guided by independent consideration of
what reasonable nonbelief might be and the justifications a God might
have for permitting it, without much attention to ways in which more general considerations concerning the nature of God might constrain what can
be said here; whereas I myself start, as it were, ‘from above’, with those general considerations, which, I have argued, suggest that, contrary to what
might otherwise seem plausible, a loving God would not permit inculpable
nonbelief of any kind or for any duration. With this in mind a theist will
indeed find troubling someone’s “ongoing and free inquiry” if it occurs in
the context of inculpable doubt. By the same token, inculpable doubt of a
relevant sort will be seen to occur whenever one’s present evidence leaves
one inculpably without theistic belief, and the idea of an inculpable parity
belief will be interpreted accordingly — which means, of course, that the
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idea that an inculpable parity belief might require never ceasing to investigate (an idea critical, as we have seen, to Henry’s central argument) will
not so much as arise.
(3) I have spoken of misunderstandings in Henry’s essay concerning the
nature and object of inculpable investigation. There are also misunderstandings concerning the standards by which it may be assessed.
Specifically, two more sufficient conditions are mistakenly construed as
necessary: my criterion’s already mentioned sufficient condition of inculpable doubt, given in terms of a non-neglectfully held parity belief (call this
condition A and the criterion or standard referring to it the A standard),12
and my sufficient condition for non-neglectful parity belief, which combines
careful inquiry, honesty and love of truth displayed in other contexts, a
desire to believe, and controversy among experts on the issue in question
(call this latter conjunctive condition B and the standard referring to it the B
standard).13 Henry writes (82): “The standards established to ward off
charges of insincere or shoddy investigation [the conjunction of which is the
B standard] render improbable the parity position giving rise to (3) [my
claim that inculpable nonbelief exists, which, as I have noted, Henry mistakenly reads in terms of doubt], and...the empirical improbability of (3) renders the conclusions derived from it improbable as well.” Since the only
parity position that could be seen as “giving rise to” the notion that there is
inculpable doubt is a non-neglectfully held parity position, we may presumably take this as implying that the application of the B standard renders
improbable the view that there are any non-neglectfully held parity beliefs,
and so renders it improbable that there is any inculpable doubt. But all that
Henry has actually argued is that probably no one satisfying the B standard
would hold – and so no such individual would non-neglectfully hold – a
parity belief. To get from here to the view that there probably are no nonneglectfully held parity beliefs he has to assume that if there are non-neglectfully held parity beliefs, then the persons holding them have satisfied the B standard
– which is to say that he must assume that B is not just a sufficient but also a
necessary condition of a non-neglectfully held parity belief.14 And to get
from the view that there probably are no non-neglectfully held parity beliefs
to his final conclusion that there probably is no inculpable doubt, he has to
assume that if there is inculpable doubt, then there are non-neglectfully held parity
beliefs – which is to say that he must assume that A is not just a sufficient but
also a necessary condition of inculpable doubt.
But in my book, whose assumptions Henry purports to be exploiting
here, neither A nor B is construed as a necessary condition. Take B. What I
have claimed is that it is “clear that in certain circumstances [viz. where B
obtains and is seen to obtain] a judgment in favor of the subject [in favour of
the view that her parity belief is non-neglectfully held] would be appropriate.”15 This suggests that if B obtains, a parity belief is non-neglectful – which
is to say that B’s obtaining represents a sufficient condition of a non-neglectful
parity belief. Thus even if the various parts of B were not jointly instantiated
in some case of parity belief, it would not follow, on my view, that that parity belief is neglectful. Indeed, I would say that where all of these parts
obtain, and are known to obtain, our justification for believing that a parity
belief is non-neglectfully held is overdetermined, and so it is not the case that
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their joint obtaining is necessary. If, for example, one has careful inquiry and
general honesty and a love of the truth, why should one demand that there
be, in addition, a strong desire to believe? My aim in arguing that all these
items do obtain in various cases of parity belief was to convince even those
whose religious views strongly – and in my view unfortunately16 – predispose them to reject all cases of parity belief as culpable.
What about A? Its status as no more than a sufficient condition is also
explicitly indicated and explained in the book. Again (as shown in my earlier statement of it) there is an “if” instead of an “if and only if”. And again
no more than this is justified. We cannot suppose that every inculpable
doubter must be a non-neglectful parity believer without implausibly
assuming that individuals incapable of a parity belief cannot be doubters,17
and also ignoring the fact that persons who are in the process of investigating their evidence and perhaps on their way to a parity belief may, precisely because they are unsure about what their evidence does or does not
show, be unsure about (i.e. in doubt about) theism.
Now if Henry’s assumptions concerning A and B are false or unsupported in the way I have indicated, then clearly his argument is unsuccessful. This point, in conjunction with the various others independently
showing this to be the case, lead me to conclude that the argument from
reasonable nonbelief faces no threat from this quarter.18
3. Peculiar Problems: Lehe
I come now to Lehe’s resolute resistance of that argument. He claims that
we are unjustified in supposing that there is inculpable nonbelief, and also
unjustified in supposing that a loving God would wish to prevent it.
Lehe’s approach to the latter conclusion appears to be strongly colored by
his way of treating the former: an emphasis on resistance of the will of God
is to be detected in both (see 162 and 170). And his way of treating the former is, as he admits, strongly influenced by his commitment to a form of
Christianity that sees nonbelief as, at bottom, a symptom of unwillingness
to conform to God’s demands (172). This gives his essay something of a
confessional flavor, and means, I think, that few who are not already in his
camp are likely to find his arguments convincing. Moreover, as we have
already seen, his argument for the first conclusion could establish at most
that we are unjustified in ever accepting doubt as inculpable. But it will
nonetheless be useful to consider Lehe’s reasoning on its merits, to see
whether and by whom it might reasonably be deemed successful. What I
shall argue is that it does not succeed, and that this is a conclusion even
those who are in his camp should accept.
Lehe’s reasoning in defence of the view that we are unjustified in supposing that there is any inculpable doubt runs as follows. Non-intellectual
(i.e. moral and/or spiritual) forms of culpability, involving resistance of
“commitment to a righteous and demanding God, who commands us to
‘take up the cross and follow Christ’” (169), must be viewed as possible in
all the cases of doubt that my purely intellectual standards (standards A
and B, mentioned above) might lead us to accept as inculpable. Of course,
nonbelievers can be morally virtuous, but “no one is virtuous enough to be
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immune to the kinds of spiritual deficiencies that can prevent one from
surrendering to the will of God”. In particular, “[t]o be justified in believing that one’s doubt is inculpable would require being justified in believing
that there is no self-deception or subconscious bias against religious commitment involved in the investigation” (170). Desire for belief is no guarantee against this: “One might [for example] want to believe that God
exists so that one will enjoy eternal happiness after death and at the same
time be repulsed by the prospect of involvement in religious institutions
that are not well respected by one’s cultural peers” (171). In light of all
these facts, “[w]ith the possibility of bias and self-deception ever present,
especially when religious beliefs are under consideration, it is very difficult
for anyone to be justified in asserting her own...inculpability. And the
more intellectually honest one is, the less likely it is that she will insist that
she is completely free from bias or self-deception” (171). Hence no one is
justified in supposing that inculpable doubt exists.
It will perhaps be evident that, as it stands, this is at most an argument
for the conclusion that the doubter is not justified in accepting her own
inculpability. And this is a problem. For not only doubters may be
inclined to accept the argument from reasonable nonbelief; and doubters
who are thus inclined need not take the critical support for my premise
referring to reasonable nonbelief to be their own doubt. Indeed, they
might regard their own doubt as having dubious origins, and yet take that
premise to be overwhelmingly supported by the inculpability of others.
But perhaps Lehe’s point can be generalized: perhaps he can say that the
more aware we are of the possibility of self-deception, the less inclined we
should be to think that anyone’s doubt is inculpable. Despite the fact that
he several times speaks of the nonbeliever inferring the nonexistence of
God from her own inculpability, let us assume that Lehe’s point is indeed
intended to have this broader scope. What then? Well, some of the punch
of his psychological-cum-moral point is now taken away, for that depended on our feeling the presumption of assuming our own inculpability in this
connection. And there need be none of this when we conclude that another’s doubt is inculpable. (Indeed, we might have good reason to draw such
a conclusion in faithfulness to our experience of a doubting friend even
when the doubter herself – entirely free of presumption – is hesitant about
doing so!) But are there independent reasons for regarding Lehe’s argument as plausible, when it is broadened in the suggested manner?
It seems to me that this is not the case. Here my earlier point about selfdeception might be re-introduced, but I want to focus on other, more specific, considerations. Notice first, though, that one who declared someone’s doubt to be inculpable through an application of my A and B standards would necessarily already have considered the wider moral and
spiritual possibilities Lehe emphasizes. Contrary to his suggestion, my
standards are not purely intellectual, and there is no extra moral/spiritual
content that I have forgotten to factor in here. We have seen that the culpability point emerges in discussion of resistance of God and not in some independent consideration of the nature of epistemic inculpability, as Lehe
supposes (see 169); and it would be hard to say what the culpability
involved in resistance of God might be if not moral/spiritual!
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So what is the result of applying standards A and B? Lehe claims that
we will never be justified in thinking that someone’s nonbelief is not due to
the motives he mentions, but this seems false. We are justified in supposing that unconscious resistance to the rigors and demands of religious
commitment (sponsored by earlier conscious neglect) is absent when the
application of our standards uncovers evidence that many doubters have
deeply entrenched general qualities – for example, compassion, courage,
humility, devotion to the good of humankind – disposing them to welcome such things, and even more strikingly, evidence that some doubters
are already pursuing a religious path despite the absence of belief.19 Many
show commitment of a sort that makes Lehe’s suggestion quite implausible when applied to them – and this even believers should be able to see.20
Suppose however that, contrary to what the evidence shows, all
doubters have the hidden desires and feelings of resistance to which Lehe
refers. It is not at all clear how these would cause someone who has them
to take steps to remove or prevent theistic belief in the face of evidence that
would otherwise be causally sufficient for it, as opposed to making her
screen out the more unfriendly implications of her belief (perhaps by
focusing on the friendlier implications that, as Lehe himself admits, might
make even the ones who possess the psychological states to which he
refers desire to believe). One may believe and yet rationalize away the
need for certain actions in response to one’s belief. Indeed, to this sort of
rationalization theists in the actual world, and even Christians, regularly
succumb. Even believers will sometimes not want to do the will of God,
and fail to do the will of God, as they understand it. But notice that they
are and remain believers – there is no correlation between such psychological
states as they possess and the loss of belief. So why suppose that just such
states may nonetheless be operative in just this way in troublesome cases
of doubt, which might otherwise have to be declared inculpable, even
where there is good evidence of motives that would prevent it, actions
incompatible with it, and also indications that evidential factors which the
nonbeliever can develop in great detail are responsible for the absence of
belief? Why indeed! Lehe’s argument is, in the circumstances, quite
unconvincing, and for reasons whose force anyone apprised of those circumstances should be able to feel.21
Let us turn now to Lehe’s reasoning on behalf of his other conclusion —
that we are not justified in thinking God would prevent reasonable nonbelief. Here there are several independent points: (1) Some nonbelievers,
even if their lack of belief owes nothing to culpability of any kind, may still
be unwilling to submit to God in the manner necessary for truly beneficial
relationship with God, and so God, seeing this, can choose not to give
them evidence sufficient for belief without depriving them of any of the
goods I say would motivate God to provide it (164). (2) Struggling with
doubt may trigger self-examination of a sort that reveals deficiencies of the
sort that need to be removed for truly beneficial relationship with God, and
so God may withhold evidence on this account (162). (3) Some individuals,
while perhaps not deficient in the aforementioned way, may lack the longing for God or, more generally, the degree of moral and spiritual maturity
which would permit them to get the most out of relationship with God, and
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doubt may be God’s way of dealing with this (163). (4) Even if none of the
preceding points applies, it is not at all obvious that the most effective way
to get people to convert religiously is to give them belief in God, since such
belief is not sufficient for conversion (165). (5) There is great intrinsic value
in God allowing people to, as it were, figure things out for themselves
(166). (6) There is both intrinsic and instrumental value in the intellectual
debate that is sponsored by the presence of doubt (166-167).
Here again one might observe that many theists and even Christians are
blessed with belief despite serious moral and spiritual deficiencies or lack
of maturity, and be led to wonder why we should think that God, who (if
existent) is presumably not stymied by this fact and has resources for helping them grow, should need to adopt a different policy with the inculpable
doubters in question. In a similar vein, we might point out that given our
finitude and many complex needs, there is an unlimited amount of interesting and important ‘figuring out’ available even to believers, and that
there has been no lack of intellectual debate within their ranks! But I think
it will be useful to focus attention instead on certain more general considerations, the neglect of which is, I think, responsible for philosophers not
noticing the force of such points, and for the continuing appeal of points
like Lehe’s (1) to (6).
Recall that my argument, in its reasoning ‘from above’, earlier mentioned, paints the following picture. If God is perfect love and brings
beings into existence to love, then they will (in the absence of their own
efforts to bring about a different state of affairs, which love presumably
would respect) always be in a position to relate personally to God (free to
do so if they should choose to) insofar as they are capable of such relationship. Indeed, at the dawn of the relevant capacities, the conditions
required for being in a position to exercise those capacities will also be
there. And it is because belief is one of those conditions – and because God
in willing a certain state must naturally will all its conditions – that the
argument says we might expect, in the absence of resistance, always to be
in the presence of evidence sufficient for belief (not, as Lehe suggests – see
his point (4) above – because God is to be construed as thinking of belief as
a particularly good means to conversion or as by itself a sufficient condition of relationship with God). Now if this is the argument, then one cannot assume in response that God would be deciding what evidence to provide on a case by case basis and that any evidence God might provide would
be a disruption in the midst of life without begging the question against it.
And it is just such an assumption that one finds in Lehe’s first three points.
God could only have the reasons for withholding evidence to which he
here refers – for example, the reason represented by the existence of inculpable but nonsubmissive nonbelievers – if God did not express the more primal relational disposition to always will the conditions of freedom to relate
personally with God that I have argued a perfectly loving God would
express, for otherwise there would be no such nonbelievers. This point has
been neglected in discussions of the argument from reasonable nonbelief.
But could it perhaps be overcome – could the aforementioned assumption
be supported, and Lehe’s points redeemed – by some other more general
‘companion’ reason which explains why God might choose to be remote
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from the beginning in some or all cases? Might Lehe’s (5) and (6) themselves
represent such reasons?
In seeking to support an affirmative answer to these questions, the critic
faces a second major – and I think insurmountable – problem. For given
the natural disposition of Divine love to express itself in the relevant fashion, the only sort of reason that, if it existed, might have been appealing to
God as a reason for remaining withdrawn from human beings would be
one whose dominant concern could not be met within the framework of
Divine-human interaction set out above. And this condition is not satisfied
by the reasons Lehe advances. Spiritually efficacious revelation of
moral/spiritual deficiencies, nurturance of longing for God and of deeper
spiritual maturity, occasions for meaningful investigation and intellectual
debate – all of these goods can be provided within the context of a relationship-conducive set of conditions, with humans at all points left free to
decide how to respond to God (indeed, with a larger set of options than
they could otherwise enjoy), and with no second-guessing of human
responses on God’s part. Surely this is a more theologically attractive picture than one in which God is not naturally loving in the first place – too
much of a ‘distant father’ to relate easily with children – or suspicious and
controlling or insufficiently equipped to satisfy both the impulse to make
relationship possible and the desire to nurture human growth and flourishing. But how, it may be asked, can such things as longing for God be
nurtured without preventing or removing evidence sufficient for belief?
Here, it seems to me, we have a question that evinces a lack of theological
imagination (or perhaps an unwillingness to summon it in this cause).
There is first of all the fact that the longing for God of finite humans would
only grow as more of God was revealed: since the attractions of unsurpassable greatness could never fully be known, new levels of intimacy with the
Divine would only disclose new and deeper powers of longing within the
human heart. And there is in any case a second level of hiddenness that
could only operate within Divine-human relationship, a sense of the
absence of God that even a believer can feel (and without losing evidence
sufficient for belief), and that can be even more effective in promoting such
ends as those to which Lehe appeals, because of the sense of loss attendant
upon it. This point is prominent in my book,22 discussed in connection
with matters Lehe addresses, but inexplicably ignored by him, despite my
emphasis on it and its obvious tendency to remove the forcefulness of his
points. Whatever the explanation for this may be, it seems evident that if
we apply the point in question, and others like it, in conjunction with an
understanding of the Divine ‘bias’ toward relationship, it will be hard to
imagine the coexistence of perfect love and reasonable nonbelief. Certainly
Lehe’s reasons are completely submerged by such considerations. Thus
here too I conclude that his case must be deemed unconvincing by any
careful investigator.
Mount Saint Vincent University
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NOTES
1. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993. Henry’s essay is ‘Does
Reasonable Nonbelief Exist?’, Faith and Philosophy 18 (2001), 75-92; Lehe’s is ‘A
Response to the Argument from the Reasonableness of Nonbelief’, Faith and
Philosophy 21(2004), 159-174. References to specific passages in these essays
will, here and there, be made parenthetically in the body of my reply.
2. See DH, pp. 58-59.
3. Here I recall my interaction, some years ago, with a young man who
had never thought about God at all. He was sensitive, gentle and kind, curious
about religion when I introduced religious questions and not at all opposed to
belief, but because of the completely nonreligious (notice: not anti-religious)
character of his environment growing up in the suburbs of a North American
city, he had simply not devoted any attention to these questions before. Now
this is just an anecdote, but it may be that many of us can recall meeting such
individuals, and perhaps we would encounter many more if we went looking
– all of which must rightly influence our views on this matter of unreflective
and reasonable nonbelief.
4. See DH, pp. 27-28; 30-31.
5. A complication here is that nonbelief can occur whether God exists or
not, and that some of the causes of the origination of nonbelief that might operate if God does not exist would not operate (assuming my argument is correct)
if God does exist. Knowing, perhaps lazy, neglect of proper investigation into
the evidence for theism, for example, will not be a cause of arriving at a state of
nonbelief if God exists (though it might be involved in remaining in such a
state), since given the immediate and constant availability of evidence of which
I have spoken, one would have to have already arrived at nonbelief through
resistance of the evidence to be in a place where investigation was needed for
belief. In such circumstances culpable resistance, shutting God out, would be
the only sort of culpable activity leading to nonbelief. (Notice that I could
therefore simply argue that some nonbelief does not originate in nonresistance,
instead of more broadly, as I have done, that some nonbelief is inculpable simpliciter. Notice also that it follows that if all we find in actual nonbelief are other
forms of culpability, then this itself is evidence against the existence of God. So
it could be that Henry and Lehe succeed in showing that my evidence of inculpability in some nonbelief can be rebutted, but – because their investigations
reveal only nonresistant forms of culpability – in the process introduce new evidence that can take its place!)
6. Henry, for example, says that my notion of reasonable nonbelief
“emerges out of an internalist epistemology” (88, n.4), and Lehe distinguishes
between “epistemic inculpability” (170), which he takes to be my only concern,
and other sorts of inculpability.
7. See DH, p. 64.
8. See DH, p. 62.
9. For a particularly clear statement of this assumption, see 79.
10. DH, p. 65.
11. In this connection see also 91, n. 27.
12. And assume that by ‘non-neglectful’ I mean not knowingly neglectful.
13. See DH, pp. 65-67.
14. For additional confirmation that this assumption is being made, notice
how Henry speaks in this connection of my “setting the bar” and setting it
“high” (80).
15. DH, p. 65.
16. On this, see my essay ‘’Breaking Down the Walls that Divide’: Virtue
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and Warrant, Belief and Nonbelief’, Faith and Philosophy 21(2004), 195-213.
17. See DH, p. 60.
18. A couple of difficulties in the later part of Henry’s essay (so far unmentioned) may briefly be noted. First, he infers from my claim that certain feelings and actions essential to personal relationship with God are precluded by
nonbelief that “one cannot have religious experience in the absence of belief in
God” (84). But this does not follow. Religious experiences apparently of God
often bring belief with them, and then one may have the feelings and do the
actions I have mentioned (which do not themselves count as religious experience of the perceptual sort in question here). Second, in discussing my claim
that certain actions cannot be done in the absence of theistic belief, he argues
that if this were true then, contrary to what is in fact the case, none of our
actions would be within our control (i.e., presumably, such as we can choose),
since they all depend on beliefs that are involuntary (85). Much could be said
about the phrase ‘depend on’, but suffice it to say that all that can with any
plausibility be held to follow from my claim (together with the additional
premise) is that we cannot choose any actions that depend on beliefs which we
lack. And this is untroubling, since in most cases of action (certainly the ones
Henry wants to use as counterexamples), we do not lack the relevant beliefs.
19. Henry notices at least the possibility of this phenomenon. What he
neglects to point out is that it is actually instantiated, and by parity believers.
20. Notice here that, contrary to what Lehe suggests in insisting that we
cannot rule out the possibility of self-centred self-deception, one does not
require absolute certainty for justified belief that someone lacks a certain desire,
any more than for other claims we believe every day.
21. For more extended discussion of these matters, see my ‘Breaking Down
the Walls.’
22. See DH, pp. 203-204.

